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CONSCIOUSLY PARALLEL ACTION IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
MICHAEL CONANT*
Economic theory as a tool for the solution of social problems in
the markets for goods and services is useful only if it can be demon-
strated logically how the theory is applied to the specific factors of
any given practical situation. As applied to criminal prosecution
under the federal anti-trust laws this postulate is stated: "Guilt
cannot be inferred from an unsupported economic theory."', It is
the purpose of this paper to analyze the application of the eco-
nomic theory of oligopoly to the analogous legal doctrine of con-
sciously parallel action in restraint of trade.
The economic theory of oligopoly explains how, in a market
of only a few firms, these firms may adopt price-output policies
like or similar to those which would result if they combined to
restrain trade (a monopoly) and how they are able to accomplish
this without an actual or tacit agreement. The legal doctrine of
conscious parallelism of action developed as an extension of
cases decided under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which makes
conspiracies or agreements in restraint of trade illegal. This doc-
trine in effect holds that like marketing policies of the firms in a
few-firm market resulting in undue restraints of trade are illegal,
even though the classical requisite of a conspiracy or agreement is
not present. It is the transference of the inductive conclusions of
the economic theorist to the deductive application of legal doctrine
that is investigated here.
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The economic model of oligopoly describes a market in which
the number of sellers are few.2 Fewness, for purposes of a more
detailed general definition, cannot be stated numerically, but only
operatively. It is thus the market structure, in this case the exter-
nal interdependence which occurs when firms in the market are
*Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'ns v. United States, 193
F. 2d 907, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; see Dession, The Trial of Economic and
Technological Issues of Fact, 58 Yale L. J. 1019, 1243 (1949).
2. The correlative term denoting a market in which the buyers are few
is oligopsony. All the subsequent discussion is applicable to either oligopolistic
or oligopsonistic markets. For 1947 statistics on the large number of manufac-
turing industries in which a few firms made a major portion of sales, see H. R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 2B (Sen. Doc. No. 14, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
1950) 1436 et seq.; see also Nat. Resources Comm., The Structure of the
American Economy, 248-259 (1939).
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few, that is the basis of the classification. The four essential con-
ditions to an oligopolistic market situation are :3
1. Two or more firms in the market.
2. Absence of agreement or tacit agreement among the firms.
3. Each firm, in determining price-output policy, takes into
account its direct influence on price.
4. Each firm, in determining price-output policy takes into
account its indirect influence on price.
The first two conditions differentiate oligopoly from monopoly.
If there is only one firm in the market or a few firms that combine,
the result in terms of rational profit maximization can only be a
monopoly price. In the monopoly case, the firm or group face an
estimable demand function. This, together with the cost function
or functions, allows determination of the output which will maxi-
mize monopoly profits. This is not necessarily true in the oligopoly
case, as will be shown below.
The third condition differentiates oligopoly, and the other forms
of imperfect competition, from the competitive model. The firm is
aware that it cannot sell an unlimited amount of product at the
market price; it can increase sales only at a lower price. If the firm
has an estimable demand function at all, it is aware that its sales
vary inversely to its price. Most firms in the economy not dealing
on organized exchanges meet this condition.
4
The fourth condition differentiates oligopoly from other forms
of imperfect competition. Not only is the firm aware that it has an
influence on price (condition 3), but it is also aware that the other
firms selling like or similar products consider it of such significance
in the market that they will react to changes in output-price policy
of the first firm. Each firm in such a group can estimate its most
profitable marketing policies only after making a conjecture as to
the reactions of the other members and their effects upon the
inarket. This recognition by firms of both their direct and in-
3. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 31 (4th ed. 1942).
For a statement of these conditions in terms of cross-elasticities of demand,
see Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory 104
(1941). See also Fellner, Competition Among the Few 3-50 (1949) ; Machlup,
Economics of Sellers' Competition 347 et seq. (1952).
4. Sraffa, The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, [1926]
Economic Journal 535-550; Burns, The Decline of Competition 3 (1936);
Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry 5 (T.N.E.C. Mono-
graph 21, 1940) ; Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry 121
et seq. (1953).
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direct influence on price may be characterized as recognized cir-
cular interdependence in pricing.5
The price and output conditions that will prevail in an oligo-
polistic market depend upon both the nature of the product and the
structure of plants and firms in the particular market. Dynamic
market factors such as a rapidly changing technology6 or easy
entry of new firms into the market7 may result in aggressive price
or product rivalry.8 The market effect of such rivalry may approach
the competitive model.9 But, absent significant dynamic forces,
oligopolistic interdependence implies non-aggressive policies. The
Chamberlinian thesis is that when the firms are few, so that each
will take account of his total influence upon price, direct and in-
direct, "the equilibrium result is the same as though there were a
monopolistic agreement between them."'' 0
One of the simplest of oligopolistic models will illustrate the
Chamberlinian theory. Given like or similar cost functions, the con-
jectural interdependence of the firms manifests itself as a disinclina-
tion to price rivalry. By experience each firm has learned that if
it cuts price, the others will follow, and the initial price cutter will
not gain sales from the others. Each has also learned that price
raises will not be followed. The result is a rigidity of prices and
insensitivity to changes in economic factors in the market.11 The
joint profit maximization of rational oligopolists in their indi-
vidual price decisions will thus produce non-competitive market
5. Nicholls, Imperfect Competition within Agricultural Industries 114-
131 (1941).
6. Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 106-107(1951); see Jacoby, Perspectives on Monopoly, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 514, 520
(1951) ; Conant, Competition in the Farm Machinery Industry, 26 Journal of
Business 26, 34-36 (1953).
7. Triffin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 117-123; Edwards, Maintaining Com-
petition 186-248 (1949) ; Fellner, op. cit. supra note 3, at 161-162.
S. Cassels, Excess Capacity and Monopolistic Competition, 51 Q. J.
Econ. 426-443 (1937).
9. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Econ.
Rev. 241-256 (1940) ; Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of
lVorable Competition, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 349-361 (1950) ; Adelman, Effec-
tize Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1291-1304
(1948) ; Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 577, 631-641
(1953).
10. Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 3, at 48.
11. Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47 J. Pol. Econ.
568-573 (1939) ; Hall and Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behavior, Oxford
Economic Papers No. 2, 12-45; cf. Stigler, The Klinky Oligopoly Demand
Curve and Rigid Prices, 55 J. Pol. Econ. 432-449 (1947) ; Sen. Doc. No. 13,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); Means, Notes on Inflexible Prices, 26 Am.
Econ. Rev., Supp. 29 (1936); Neal, Industrial Concentration and Price In-
flexibility (1942).
1954]
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consequences. 12 The market effect of oligopoly will tend toward
the monopoly model, depending upon the degree of certainty with
which each firm can conjecture the reactions of its rivals.13
Since the power to influence a group of rival firms by one's
own price and product changes is characteristic only of a non-
competitive market situation, each firm in an oligopolistic market
is said to be exercising some monopoly power.' 4 Price and market-
ing policies are, of course, adopted with a recognition of this power.
And, profit maximization in such a market, in the absence of dy-
namic factors of market change, tends to result in a market price
approaching the monopoly one. It is in this manner that firms act-
ing independently can create the same market result as a price
fixing agreement. The firms' profits will tend to be proportional to
their ability to "get along" with the other firms in their market.'2
Price cutters and "chislers," it is said, tend to "spoil" the market.
Such aggressive marketing policies upset the oligopolistic equi-
librium that has resulted from each firm's response to the existence
of its monopoly power.
The above explication of oligopoly as an economic model dis-
tinct from conspiratorial monopoly is demonstrative of one basic
fact; the difference is not one of kind, but of degree. As Professor
Machlup has stated in the consideration of collusion in an oligopo-
listic market, the question "is not one of 'whether,' but of 'how
much'." 1 Reliance on similar expectations to regiment a market or
the signing of a formal agreement to do so can be viewed as merely
different types of collusion.'Y They are distinguished only by the de-
gree of confidence with which a member of the group can rely on
12. Fellner, op. cit. supra note 3, at 120-141. For an analysis of an-
other common oligopoly model, see Markham, The Nature and Significance
of Price Leadership, 41 Am. Econ. Rev. 891 (1951) ; Kaysen, Collusion
Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q. J. Econ. 263 (1951) ; Handler, A Study of the
Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws 42 (T.N.E.C.
Monograph 38, 1941).
13. Chamberlain, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51-53; Machlup, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 414-448; Robinson, Monopoly 24-30 (1941) ; Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (2d ed. 1947).
14. Machlup, op. cit. supra note 3, at 350; Lerner, The Concept of
Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 Rev. Econ. Studies
157 (1933).
15. Position in the market, as manifested by business planning for se-
curity against price wars, is one of the major aspects of oligopoly pricing.
Rothschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, 57 Economic Journal 299, 308-319(1947) ; cf. Conference on Price Research, Cost Behavior and Price Policy
275 (1943).
16. Machlup, op. cit. supra note 3, at 436-437; Stocking and Watkins,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 89-91.
17. Adelman, supra note 9, at 1322; Sen. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 57-58 (1949).
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his rivals not to violate the adopted policies and initiate aggressive
market policies.
Oligopoly which has resulted in a non-competitive market con-
dition, being collusive in nature, may be called collusive oligopoly.
This new concept presented to the agencies charged with enforcing
competition a new means to attack multi-firm monopolistic prac-
tices."8 To create a legal concept analogous to collusive oligopoly
and introduce it into the maintenance of competition has put a
strain on the existing narrow legal categories into which the Su-
preme Court has segmented the anti-trust laws. Thus, conscious
parallelism of action has had to be imported into the law by a
gradual lessening in the burden of proving conspiracy, 19 although
it is really collusion of a different, more subtle kind.
THE RULE
The point of departure in the development of consciously paral-
lel action in restraint of trade as a legal doctrine is two cases under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act in which some evidence of a precon-
ceived plan still remains. In both the Interstate Circuit0 and
Masonite2 cases, there was evidence of tacit conspiracy sufficient
for conviction, followed by the concert of action of the firms in
joining the plan. In the Interstate Circuit case, agreement was
instigated by a form letter from defendant Interstate, owner of
virtually all the first-run motion picture theatres in six Texas cities,
to each of the eight major distributors of motion pictures. The let-
ter invited a plan to market films which resulted in a series of
contracts between Interstate and each distributor. They provided
that in licensing Class A pictures to second run theatres, the dis-
18. See Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Yale L. J. 34-49
(1937) for a discussion of the differences in the connotations of monopoly in
law and economics that have lessened the effectiveness of the antitrust laws;
cf. Adelman, supra note 9, at 1304-1327; as to the effectiveness of monopoly
prosecutions, see Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 153, 181 (1947), and dissent of Justice Douglas in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 536 (1948).
19. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd,
192 F. 2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 929 (1952) ; Fanchon &
Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal. 1951), cert.
denied, 345 U. S. 964 (1953) ; Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190
F. 2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 909 (1952).
20. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
21. United States v. Masonite Corp, 316 U. S. 265 (1942). The concert
of action doctrine of these two cases was followed in other cases in which
there was also found circumstantial evidence of agreement. See United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 393-394 (1948) ; C-O-Two
Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U. S. 892 (1952) ; see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U. S. 131, 142 (1948).
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tributor would require those theatres not to charge less than 25
cents admission, and not to screen such pictures as part of a double
feature program. The District Court found that the distributors
had conspired among themselves and with Interstate in making
these contracts.22 The Supreme Court affirmed, 23 but added the
now famous second ground for its decision based upon the firms'
concert of action in the scheme.
24
In the Masonite case, each of the competitors of defendant
Masonite, producer of patented hardboard, was invited to and did
become a del credere agent of Masonite to sell masonite board.
Though each agency agreement with its price fixing clause was
made independently, each signer was informed of the terms of
each of the agreements previously made with others. ". . . [I]t is
clear that, as the arrangement continued, each became familiar with
its purpose and scope." '25 This is substantial evidence of agree-
ments among the sellers and, under the Sherman Act, sufficient for
conviction. But in this case, as in the Interstate Circuit case, the
court chose to emphasize the knowing participation of the firms in
a non-competitive marketing program. For the group of cases in
which there is not illegality per se, these two cases initiated the
trend away from stress upon the agreement aspect of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The emphasis was shifted to group adherence to
an unreasonable restraint of trade, the illegal objective of Section 1.
The traditional requirement of an agreement, actual or tacit,
in which the sellers join, was abandoned in the broadened concert
of action doctrine of the second American Tobacco case. 26 The
22. United States v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Tex.
1937).
23. "Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an
invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if
carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States, 306 U. S. 208, 227 (1939).
24. "While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the distribu-
tors among themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the
circumstances of this case such agreement for the imposition of restrictions
upon subsequent-run exhibitors was not a prerequisite to an unlawful con-
spiracy. It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and partici-
pated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others were asked to par-
ticipate; each knew that cooperation was essential to successful operation of
the plan. They knew that the plan, if carried out, would result in a restraint
of commerce, which, we will presently point out, was unreasonable within
the meaning of the Sherman Act, and knowing it, all participated in the plan.
The evidence is persuasive that each distributor early became aware that
the others had joined." Id. at 226-227.
25. 316 U. S. 265, 275 (1942).
26. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
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Court affirmed the conviction of the "Big Three" tobacco proces-
sors, producers of from 68 to 73 per cent of small cigarettes, for
conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. The Court affirmed the finding of power and
intent to exclude competitors, and pointed out that actual exclu-
sion of competitors was unnecessary. The evidence, however,
though not of agreement, was of consciously parallel action in adopt-
ing and pursuing non-competitive marketing policies.2 7 It was thus
from the market performance and resulting market conditions that
the conspiracy and monopolization were inferred.
Evidence was presented to the jury that defendants refused to
bid in established or in new tobacco markets unless the other de-
fendants were also present. Buying agents were instructed as to
top prices to pay and percentages of total offerings to bid for. Dis-
tinctive grades of tobacco were established for which only one
company would bid. Thus, by a program of entire market control,
consciously followed by each major firm, with awareness as to the
similar policies of the other major firms, competition was elimi-
nated.2 Hence the convictions under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
were affirmed.
The major development of the doctrine of consciously parallel
action in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act has taken place
in cases involving the local distribution of motion pictures. The
Bigelozw" case was the first case under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act to abandon the requirement of some plan or organizational
activity, such as was found in the Interstate Circuit case. The suit
alleged conspiracy among the major motion picture distributors
27. American Tobacco Co. v. United State, 147 F. 2d 93, 100 et seq. (6th
Cir. 1944). The market results of these policies reinforce the inference of
collusion of some type, since the defendants raised cigarette prices in 1931
when costs were falling. Id. at 103. As to other monopolistic marketing prac-
tices in tobacco buying, see Stocking and Watkins, op. cit. supra note 6, at
136-166, and Nicholls, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry (1951).
28. "No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy. Often crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts
of the person accused and done in pursuance of a criminal purpose. Where
the conspiracy is proved, as here, from the evidence of the action taken in
concert by the parties to it, it is all the more convincing proof of an intent to
exercise the power of exclusion acquired through that conspiracy. The
essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be
found in a course of dealing or other circumstances as well as in an ex-
change of words." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781,
809-810 (1946).
29. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F. 2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945),
rev'd as to proof of damages, 327 U. S. 251 (1946) ; the rule of this case was
followed in another case affirming a jury's inference of conspiracy of distribu-
tors to deny plaintiff first-run film. Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 176 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949).
19541
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to maintain the "Chicago system of release." Under this distribu-
tion system, each theater was classified as to how many weeks
after loop first-run it would be allowed to license and screen films.
The contracts between the distributors and the Chicago exhibitors
uniformly contained schedules of minimum admission prices on
the basis of playing position assigned.30 The facts established the
operation of a feudal system of market regimentation.
Relying upon the Interstate and Masonite cases, the Court of
Appeals found the verdict of the jury for plaintiff to be supported
by substantial evidence. 31 However, it reversed the trial court's
judgment on the ground that plaintiff had not proved damages. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held the proof of damages sufficient,
reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the
district court.
The Court of Appeals of the third circuit has given substantial
strength to the doctrine of consciously parallel action in restraint
of trade in three suits alleging conspiracy to deny plaintiffs first-
run films for their theatres. In the first two, the Goldman3 2 and
Ball 3 cases, plaintiffs each acquired a theatre in a Pennsylvania
city and requested the distributors who formerly licensed film to
those theatres to license to them. In spite of offers of higher license
fees than rivals were paying, the distributors uniformly refused
first-run film to the new operators in both cases. Both cases were
tried without juries, and judgments were entered for defendants.3 4
The Court of Appeals in the Goldman case, relying on the rule
in the Interstate Circuit case, reversed the lower court. It held that
the evidence established a monopolization by Warner Brothers of
first-run exhibition in Philadelphia resulting from defendants' uni-
form denial of first-run films to plaintiff. Noting defendants' failure
to present testimony that there was no agreement among them for
concerted action, the Court also held that conspiracy was neces-
30. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251, 257 (1946).
31. "True no specific agreement to enter into such conspiracy on the
part of the defendants was proven, but that was not necessary. Knowing
participation *by competitors without previous agreement in a plan, the
necessary consequence of which if carried out is unreasonable restraint of
interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy." Bige-
low v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F. 2d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1945).
32. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F. 2d 738 (3d
Cir. 1945), opinion on remand, 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164
F. 2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 811 (1948).
33. Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F. 2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948)(2-1 decision).
34. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 1011
(E.D. Pa. 1944) ; Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa.
1946).
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sarily inferrable from the evidence.35 In the Ball case, though the
uniform denial of first-run films to plaintiff did not give one of the
defendants a monopoly of first-run exhibition in Amridge, the case
was nevertheless reversed. After taking cognizance of defendants'
past "proclivity to unlawful conduct," the Appeals decision held
that there did exist an inference of conspiracy among the distribu-
tors in their uniform denial of first-run films to plaintiff.36 Relying
on the Goldman ruling quoted below and on the Interstate Circuit
and Paramount cases, the Court stressed the monopolistic power of
the distributors in their adherence to the same restrictive market-
ing practice.37
As a legal doctrine, consciously parallel action in restraint of
trade appears to have reached complete acceptance in the Milgram
case.5 5 In 1949, plaintiff built a drive-in theatre on the outskirts
of Allentown, Pennsylvania. Though first-run pictures had been ex-
hibited up to that time only in downtown conventional type theatres,
plaintiff requested the eight major distributors to license first-run
films to him. Upon their uniform refusal, he filed a suit under the
antitrust laws. The evidence was entirely of consciously parallel
action. The trial court put substantial emphasis on its finding that
in this "novel problem of keenest interest to every branch man-
ager," every distributor must be aware of how the others had de-
35. "Plaintiff's evidence shows that there is concert of action in what
has been done and that this concert could not possibly be sheer coincidence.
We think that there must have been some form of informal understanding."
William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F. 2d 738, 743 (3d Cir.
1945).
"Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing
business where each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which
is the restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful
conspiracy under the statutes before us." Id. at 745.
36. "They [defendants] say further that each appellee simply did not
know the others were shunning the Penn, and that statement is incredible.
They all knew Paramount's vital interest in the State. This was Paramount's
ordinary theatre arrangement throughout the United States with which he
other distributors were constantly dealing. .*. . They, experienced, shrewd
business people as they claim to be and as, in fact, they are, had to know the
picture bookings and the entire situation at the State." Ball v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 169 F. 2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1948).
37. "When an industry is so powerful that it can and actually does re-
fuse to permit the existence of an individual enterprise within its confines(and that's what the shutting off of first runs from Penn probably amounts
to) that industry is going beyond its freedom to trade as it chooses. It comes
into sharp conflict with the statutory provisions of the Sherman and Clayton
\cts. It is acting unlawfully in restrain of trade." Id. at 321.
38. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F. 2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951) (2-1 deci-
,ion), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 929 (1952).
1954]
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cided to respond to the Milgram's demands.39 After reviewing the
earlier conscious parallelism cases, the trial court concluded:
"In practical effect, consciously parallel business practices have
taken the place of the concept of meeting of the minds which
some of the earlier cases emphasized. Present concert of action,
further proof of actual agreement among the defendants is
unnecessary, and it then becomes the duty of the court to
evaluate all the evidence in the setting of the case at hand and
to determine whether a finding of conspiracy to violate the act
is warranted."4 °
In affirming the decree for plaintiff, the Court of Appeals relied
on the fact that the portion of the Paramount case concerned with
proof of a "conspiracy to fix minimum admission prices and estab-
lish uniform clearances and runs was essentially consciously paral-
lel business practices. 14 1 The Court also relied upon the Interstate
Circuit, Goldman, and Ball cases. The rule of these cases was ex-
tended to the point where the Court was stating in effect that no
evidence of conspiracy, actual or tacit, is necessary for a finding of
conspiracy." As will be shown below, this is an unnecessary and
incorrect reduction in the evidence required to prove conspiracy.
What the Court should have said was that undue restraint of trade
violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, whether accomplished by
conspiracy or by independent decision of each firm to adopt poli-
cies identical to those of the other sellers in the market.
As shown above, all the conscious parallelism cases under the
Sherman Act took the form of lessening the necessary requirements
to prove conspiracy. However, the leading case under the supple-
mentary antitrust statutes introduced consciously parallel restraints
as a separate and distinct cause of action. The Rigid Steel Conduit
case 43 arose as a petition for a review of a Federal Trade Commis-
sion cease and desist order under the broad prohibitions of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.44 The first count of the com-
39. "It is incredible that each proceeded in ignorance of how the others
were dealing with it." Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E.D.
Pa. 1950).
40. Id. at 419.
41. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F. 2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951) citing
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 341-346, aff'd,
334 U. S. 131, 146-147 (1948).
42. Milgrani v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F. 2d 579, 584 (3d Cir. 1951).
43. Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir.
1948), aff'd by a divided court sub nora. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336
U. S. 956 (1949). See Kittelle and Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine
and Delivered Pricing, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 227 (1950) ; Sen. Doe.
No. 27, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 43-63 (1949).
44. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914),
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45(a) (1946). This broader prohibition of anti-coin-
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plaint charged the fourteen corporate respondents with conspiracy
to restrict competition by adopting a basing point method of quoting
prices for rigid steel conduit. Two of the respondents were exon-
erated by the Commission from the conspiracy charge. However,
all of the respondents were found to have violated the second count
based upon "conscious parallelism of action." It charged a viola-
tion "through their concurrent use of a formula method of making
delivered price quotations with knowledge that each did likewise,
with the result that price competition between and among them
was unreasonably restrained. 4 5 In support of the first count was a
finding of collective consideration of pricing policies by representa-
tives of defendants through November, 1939. In support of the
second count were findings of uniform adherence to the specific
basing point formula of pricing and to many other marketing poli-
cies.
Upon appeal, the petitioning corporations alleged that the ex-
tended findings of the Commission's opinion did not produce direct
evidence of conspiracy.46 The Court of Appeals held that there was
direct proof of conspiracy, but it stated that such direct proof of
agreement was not necessary. It stressed the facts which demon-
strated consciously parallel action in restraint of trade.47 The Court
petitive activity does not require the existence of a conspiracy. FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 721 (1948).
45. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175, 176. Back-
ground to this decision were a group of cases alleging conspiracy and holding
illegal a "planned common course of action" to maintain a delivered price
system. Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F. 2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Ameri-
can Chain & Cable Co. v. FTC, 139 F. 2d 622 (4th Cir. 1944) ; United States
Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F. 2d 161 (7th Cir. 1945); Milk and Ice Cream
Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F. 2d 478 (7th Cir. 1945); Fort Howard Paper
Co. v. FTC, 156 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 795 (1946) ; FTC
v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948) ; see Edwards, Geographic Price
Formulas and the Concentration of Economic Power, 37 Geo. L. J. 135 (1949) ;
Wright, Collusion and Parellel Action in Delivered Price Systems, 37 Geo.
L. . 201 (1949).
46. Rigid Steel Conduit Ass'n, 38 F. T. C. 534 (1944).
47. "As already noted, each conduit seller knows that each of the other
sellers is using the basing point formula; each knows that by using it he
will be able to quote identical delivered prices and thus present a condition
of matched prices under which purchasers are isolated and deprived of choice
among sellers so far as price advantage is concerned. Each seller must sys-
tematically increase or decrease his mill net price for customers at numerous
destinations in order to match the delivered prices of his competitors. Each
seller consciously intends not to attempt the exclusion of any competition
from his natural freight advantage territory by reducing the price, and in
effect, invites the others to share the available business at matched prices
in his natural market in return for a reciprocal invitation." Triangle Conduit
& Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1948).
" [P]rice uniformity especially if accompanied by an artificial price
level not related to the supply and demand of a given commodity may be
evidence from which an agreement or understanding, or some concerted
action of sellers operating to restrain commerce, may be inferred." Id. at 179.
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then affirmed the Commission's order as to all the respondents, in-
cluding the two which had been dismissed from the first count but
not the second. However, the court also affirmed the Commission's
finding that the individual use of the basing point method consti-
tuted an unfair method of competition. 48 This may lessen the
strength of the ruling as to conscious parallelism of action.
Two subsequent attacks on delivered pricing practices under the
Federal Trade Commission Act firmly establish the doctrine of
consciously parallel action in restraint of trade for delivered
pricing cases. In both the Book Paper49 and Crown ° cases, al-
though there was some initial organizational activity by the trade
associations in the field, the evidence of a continuing conspiracy
had to be inferred from the evidence of uniform adoption and
maintenance of a pricing pattern. In the former case, there was a
finding of "uniform quantity discounts, uniform finishing differen-
tials, uniform base prices, and a uniform zoning system with uni-
form zone differentials, all without regard to a particular peti-
tioner's costs of production and distribution. '' In the latter case,
from the evidence of product standardization and a freight equaliza-
tion scheme, the court found "the indisputable fact that through
the business practices followed by petitioners it has resulted that
in an industry of which they control 85% there has been no price
change in ten years, and absolutely no price competition what-
ever."
52
THE COUNTER-RULE
Anti-monopoly law is one of the key points in an enterprise
economy where the basic legal problem of adjusting the free voli-
tion of individuals to the enacted social control is clearly and con-
stantly before the courts.5 In the area in which the law is expand-
ing to embrace more subtle forms of anti-competitive activity, ap-
pellate courts are faced with determining the fine point of balance
between these two opposing forces.5 4 It is here that new concepts,
48. Id. at 181; Dawkins, Defenses Available in Cases of Geographic
Price Discriminations, 37 Geo. L. J. 217 (1949) ; Head, Validity Under the
Robinson-Patman Act of a Uniform Delivered Price of One Seller, 31 Minn.
L. Rev. 599 (1947).
49. Allied Paper Mills v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U. S. 918 (1949).
50. Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F. 2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949).
51. Allied Paper Mills v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 1948).
52. Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F. 2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1949).
53. See comment on the legal problem in Kessler and Sharp, Contracts
Cases and Materials 2 (1953) ; Carlston, Role of Antitrust Law in the
Democratic State, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 587 (1952).
54. Whether courts are equipped for it or not, antitrust decisions re-
quire the application of economic analysis. Jackson, dissenting in Standard
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such as consciously parallel action in restraint of trade, are born.
And it is here that one is likely to find two opposing rules of law
being applied to groups of cases of very similar factual situations.
The different viewpoints of courts and the whims of juries become
determinants of whether a particular case comes within the de-
veloping rule of law or its counter-rule.5 5 The major cases restrict-
ing the application of the doctrine of consciously parallel action in
restraint of trade are summarized below and illustrate the develop-
ment of the counter-rule.
The majority of cases limiting the doctrine of consciously paral-
lel action in restraint of trade also originated in the motion picture
industry. In the usual pattern, these cases arise from the uniform
refusal of the major motion picture distributors to license films to
the plaintiff exhibitor in the particular run he requests. One of the
earliest cases, typical of those in the industry, Nlas the Westway
case."" The complaint charged seven of the eight major motion
picture distributors with conspiracy to refrain from licensing films
to plaintiffs theatre in Baltimore until 14 days after the films had
been shown at the Edgewood Theatre. Upon its dismissal of the
bill, the court found an absence of two of the basic requisites for
liability. First, it found complete independence of judgment of the
distributors and hence no joint action in adopting like patterns of
distribution. It thus concluded that no inference of conspiracy
could be made.5 7 Second, the court distinguished the Interstate
Circuit case and found the run and clearance provisions in each of
the individual contracts between defendants and plaintiff to be
reasonable restraints of trade. These provisions were held to be
legal incidents of the film copyright.
In the other motion picture cases denying relief, some stressed
the finding of no inference of conspiracy or that such finding by
a trial judge was supported by the evidence.5 8 Another affirmed
such a judgment based upon a verdict of a jury.5 9 Two other cases,
Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 322 (1949) ; Paramount Pic-
tures. Inc. v. United Motion Pictures Theatre Owners, 93 F. 2d 714, 719 (3d
Cir. 1937).
55. Compare the dissent of Judge Hastie with the opinion of the court
in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F. 2d 579, 587 (3d Cir. 1951).
56. Wesway Theatre Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 30 F. Supp.
830 (Md. 1940), aff'd, 113 F. 2d 932 (4th Cir. 1940).
57. "Uniform action is not necessarily concert of action." Id. at 833.
58. Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F. 2d 891 (7th
Cir. 1941) ; Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 189 F. 2d
797 (4th Cir. 1951) ; G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 107
F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
59. Fifth and Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 176 F. 2d 587 (2d Cir. 1949).
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while first finding no conspiracy, emphasized the second aspect of
these cases, that the patterns of runs and clearances adopted were
reasonable restraints of trade.60 Independent reasonable business
decision was pointed to as a key factor. 61
Under the more strict burden of proof of a criminal case, a con-
viction for conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, based
on the verdict of a jury, was reversed in the Pevely Dairy case.02
In that case, consciously parallel action in pricing by the two
largest dairies in St. Louis, processors of 63 per cent of the fluid
milk in the marketing area, was shown by the evidence. There
were conflicting interpretations of the market significance of the
data on prices and costs and their changes. The judgment was re-
versed and a new trial ordered though the evidence of conscious-
ly parallel pricing was not refuted. 63 The ground for the order was
that from the market evidence it was possible to infer that no
restraint of trade resulted. 4 The Court of Appeals was of the
opinion that the evidence tended to show that each price change was
the result of a change in costs and that the consciously parallel pric-
ing of the two dairies did not stabilize prices.
The cases restricting the enlargement of the doctrine of con-
sciously parallel action in restraint of trade have reached a climax
in the Theatre Enterprises case.6 5 In 1949 plaintiff built the Crest,
a new theatre, in a shopping center 6 miles from downtown Balti-
more. Although all the theatres previously showing first-run films
in the competitive area were in downtown Baltimore, plaintiff de-
manded first-run film from the eight major distributors. Upon
their uniform refusal to license first-run films to him, plaintiff filed
suit for an injunction and damages, alleging conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Sherman and Clayton acts. Plaintiff presented evidence
60. Fanchon & AMarco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84
(S.D. Cal. 1951), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 964 (1953) ; Chorak v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 196 F. 2d 225 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 887(1952), Justices Black, Reed and Douglas noting dissent from the denial.
61. ". . . [A]ll of the clearance negotiations and arrangements of the
distributor-appellees resulted from nothing more than common business
solutions of identical problems in a highly competitive area." Id. at 230.
62. Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F. 2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949)
(2-1 decision), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 942 (1950).
63. "We are clear that mere uniformity of prices in the sale of a
standardized commodity such as milk is not in itself evidence of a violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Id. at 369. Chamberlin, Theory of MIonopo-
listic Competition (4th ed. 1942), quoted id. at 368.
64. Where there is only circumstantial evidence of conspiracy," [t]o
sustain conviction, it must not only have been consistent with the defendants'
guilt, but must have been inconsistent with their innocence." Id. at 370.
65. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
346 U. S. 537 (1954).
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of guaranteed offers to license first-run films at higher rentals than
bid by the downtown theatres, but defendants attacked these as
not being made in good faith. From a judgment on a general ver-
dict for defendants, plaintiff appealed, charging error in the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that the only question for their
decision was the amount of damages which plaintiff had suffered.
Plaintiff contended that he should have received a directed verdict
as to defendants' violation of the antitrust laws.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for defendant,
stating that the evidence would support the inference of both of the
opposing parties." In affirming this decision, the Supreme Court
delimited the necessary and possible inferences of consciously paral-
lel action as follows:
"The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward
petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from agree-
ment, tacit or express. To be sure, business behavior is admissi-
ble circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer
agreement. . . .But this Court has never held that proof of
parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or,
phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sher-
man Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously paral-
lel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional
judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism'
has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.11
7
In its preoccupation with the absence of actual or tacit conspiracy,
the Court failed to comment on the fact that plaintiff was just as
effectively excluded from bidding and competing in the first-run
market by the consciously parallel action of defendants in denying
him first-run films as he would have been had they planned his ex-
clusion.
FACTUAL BASIS OF LIABILITY
Two basic conditions appear essential to proof of illegal con-
scious parallelism of action in a market. The first of these is parallel
price and marketing policies with a mutual awareness by each firm
that the others in the group are following the same or similar price
and marketing policies. The second is a non-competitive market re-
sult from their total pricing or marketing policies, which the court
finds to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. These conditions
follow logically from the transference of concepts from the eco-
nomic theory of collusive oligopoly to the legal doctrine of con-
sciously parallel action in restraint of trade.
66. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
201 F. 2d 306, 313 (4th Cir. 1953).
67. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
3-46 U. S. 537, 540-541 (1954).
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Uniform or parallel prices alone, of course, are not evidence
of any market structure or condition. A one-price market is charac-
teristic of perfect competition, perfect monopoly, and many oligopoly
models. The mutual awareness of rivals policies, making necessary
a conjecture as to expected reactions of rivals to changes in one's
own policies, is the result of few firms being in the market. This
is the unique aspect of the oligopoly model. In the prosecution of
a lawsuit, mutual awareness of each other's policies might be estab-
lished by the testimony of corporate officers as to what factors they
considered in deciding price and marketing policies. It might also
be inferred from the market structure itself, if the firms are very
few and the products highly substitutible. For example, if certain
retailers demand from each of their few suppliers the same non-
competitive market behavior and their demand is complied with,
it is a fair inference that each supplier was informed of the others'
acquiescence."" It is unlikely that a firm in an industry containing
less than 20 large firms would not be aware that the other firms
will react to its market policy changes. Thus the awareness might
be inferred backward from continued non-competitive market per-
formance by the firms in a market. Such monopolistic market pat-
terns are evidence of long-run business planning for market stability
that is possible only if rivals will "cooperate" and do not institute
aggressive price or marketing policies. Each firm has a certain de-
gree of confidence that the other firms will not upset the established
marketing pattern.
The second necessary condition for illegality arises from the
fact, discussed in Part I above, that an oligopolistic market struc-
ture need not necessarily result in market performance that fails
to approach the competitive ideal. Dynamic market factors may
induce rivalry whose consequence is effectively competitive market
performance. Hence, substantial non-competitive market conditions
must be shown to have resulted from the adherence of the firms to
parallel price or marketing policies. 69 From an economic point of
view, the failure to take advantage of short-run profit possibilities
by changing price, product, technology or marketing methods, or
failure to react to changing underlying conditions of market struc-
ture and supply as reflected in costs, are significant evidence of
68. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 418 (1950).
69. To establish a Sherman Act violation, it is unnecessary to prove
complete monopoly or total suppression of all substitutes. Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30, 44 (1930) ; Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U. S. 143, 151 n. 6 (1951).
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the absence of competition. 70 Such conditions exist only in the ab-
sence of dynamic forces which induce aggressive rivalry for business
opportunities.7 1 Hence, even though a one-price market is evidence
of nothing, price inflexibility over a long period in a changing
economic scene is evidence of non-competitive market adjustment.7 2
In the two cases applying the consciously parallel action doc-
trine in its purest form, illegal restraints of trade were clearly
shown. In the Ailgram case, the use of a feudal system of status
classification of theatres as the basis for allocating film to them
instead of the enterprise system of bid and offer of prices, and the
consistent refusal of a higher price for the product were actions
quite inconsistent with competitive rivalry.7 3 In the Rigid Steel
Conduit case, the failure to cut delivered price by a seller whose
actual delivery cost is less in order to take customers away from dis-
tant firms who are invading the area closest to the seller's own plant
is also inconsistent with competitive rivalry.7 4 The other cases de-
tailed in Part II above each reveal some specific type of restraint of
trade or exercise of monopoly power.
Courts refusing to apply the consciously parallel action con-
cepts have done so by finding at least one of the two requisite con-
ditions to be missing. In the Pevely Dairy case, proof was offered
that, in spite of the oligopolistic structure, market prices were estab-
lished by a rivalry between firms which reflected response to the
basic supply conditions of the milk market.7 5 Hence, under the
70. The profit, investment, entry, and technological change indicia of
the degree of competition or monopoly are discussed in Mason, The Current
Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265,
1281 et seq. (1949); Edwards, Maintaining Competition 9-10 (1949);
Wright, Toward Coherent Anti-Trust, 35 Va. L. Rev. 665, 685 (1949);
Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of Com-
petition, 37 Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1951) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legisla-
tion: Guideposts to a Revised Antitrust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139, 1182-
1198 (1952); Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 28,
33-42 (1953).
71. Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F. 2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949);
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F. 2d 489, 497 (9th
Cir. 1952) where the court said, "Price increases which occur in times of sur-
plus or when the natural expectation would be general market decline, must
be viewed with suspicion." See Rothschild, supra note 15, at 5.
72. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 715 (1948); Levi, supra
note 18, at 120.
73. 192 F. 2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951).
74. 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v.
FTC, 336 U. S. 956 (1949) ; Wooden, The Concept of Unlawful Discrimina-
tion as it Applies to Geographic Price Differences, 37 Geo. L. J. 166, 170
et seq. (1949) ; Stocking, The Economics of Basing Point Pricing, 15 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 159, 162-164 (1950) ; Mund, The Development and Inci-
dence of Delivered Pricing in American Industry, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob.
141, 147-151 (1950) ; Machlup, The Basing-Point System (1949).
75. 178 F. 2d 363, 370 (8th Cir. 1949).
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criminal burden of proof, the appellate court found that the second
condition, a restraint of trade, was not proven. It is this type case,
where the chief monopoly manifestation alleged is a price higher
than would exist under competitive rivalry, that proof becomes
extremely difficult. Comparative data with similar other markets as
to the profits necessary to keep firms in the industry might be
quite relevant in this instance.
In the Westway and other motion picture cases won by de-
fendants, the courts, while refusing to infer collusion from conscious-
ly parallel action, put stress on their findings that the runs and
clearances attacked were reasonable restraints of trade; i.e., legal
exercises of monopoly power.76 In many of the cases no finding
was made as to the oligopolistic character of the motion picture
licensing market. However, its existence can easily be demon-
strated. 77 It was thus the second condition, an unreasonable re-
straint of trade, which the courts did not find.
The cases thus fall into the pattern. Where the firms in a
market are few, the adherence of the firms to one specific price or
marketing policy is characteristic of the awareness by rivals of
each other's policies. The resulting non-competitive condition be-
comes present only to the degree that the firms each have con-
fidence that the others will not cut price or change other policies
in an effort to take sales from each other.
LEGAL BASIS OF LIABILITY
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act should provide useful sup-
plements to each other as a statutory basis for most suits for con-
sciously parallel action in restraint of trade. The relation between
the two sections is discussed below after the discussion of Section 1.
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade is declared illegal .7  The emphasis of the cases brought
under Section 1, following the language of the statute, has been
upon the conspiracy or agreement, the preconceived plan to commit
a restraint.7 9 Previous to the conscious parallelism cases, judgments
76. See the author's forthcoming article analyzing antitrust cases of
local motion picture distribution. The theory is there presented that any
system of runs and clearances must be illegal because it is the exercise of a
discriminating monopoly by distributors who were granted only a simple or
limited monopoly by the copyright laws.
77. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416, 418 (1950) ; M1cDonough
and ,Vinslow, The Motion Picture Industry: United States v. Oligopoly, 1
Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1949).
78. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C.
§ 1 (1946L
79. Peppin, Price Fixing Agreements under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 667 (1940).
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of conviction in Section 1 cases appear to be based upon some evi-
dence of agreement, either actual or tacit. Congress, by stressing
the conspiracy element, did not in so many words declare restraint
of trade itself illegal. However, it follows logically that an agree-
ment to commit a legal act by legal means could not be illegal.
Hence, criminality must enter the conspiracy laws through an il-
legal objective or illegal method of carrying out the proposed acts.
It has thus been held that the gist of criminal conspiracy is an
agreement to accomplish an illegal purpose or a legal purpose by
illegal means.8 0 And in a Sherman Act case, it was held that it is
not the form of the combination or the particular means used, but
the results to be achieved that the statute condemns."' Thus, in
spite of the indirect language of Section 1, it is not surprising for
the Court to state in another context: "Section 1 outlaws un-
reasonable restraints on interstate commerce, regardless of the
amount of commerce affected.
8 2
In the Section 1 cases prior to 1942, and especially in the com-
mon law background of agreements in restraint of trade, the idea
of a multi-party restraint of trade in the absence of an agreement
is difficult even to conceive.13 However, the scope of the Sherman
Act, condemning combinations by trust or otherwise, should be
broad enough to encompass collusive restraints resulting merely
from the adjustments of the firms in a market to each others poli-
cies."' The absence of actual or tacit agreement in the pure con-
scious parallelism case nevertheless leaves a situation where illegal
restraint of trade may occur. Senator Sherman's comments on his
original draft of the statute stress the market consequences. He
pointed out that it is not the intention of the firm or firms which is
significant, but the results of their activities.8 5
80. United States v. Falcone, 311 U. S. 205 (1940) ; Pettibone v. United
States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 624, 628 et seq. (1941).
81. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 809 (1946).
82. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218,225 (1947).
83. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 743, 745(1950).
S4. Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitu-
tional power to curb restraints of trade unoccupied. Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 495 (1940) ; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
324 U. S. 293, 299 (1945).
85. "In providing a remedy, the intention of the corporation is immateri-
al. The intention of a corporation can not be proven. If the natural effects of
its acts are injurious, if they tend to produce evil results, if their policy is de-
nounced by the law as against the common good, it may be restrained, be
punished with a penalty or with damages.... It is the tendency of a corpo-
ration, and not its intention, that the courts can deal with." 21 Cong. Ree
2456 (1890).
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Conspiracy, then, is not a prerequisite to liability under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. The conscious parallelism cases have
merely utilized that which must be true by virtue of the logic of
statutory construction. Undue restraint of trade, regardless of the
method of accomplishment, is illegal. However, a non-competitive
practice by only one firm may be held a reasonable restraint of
trade.8 6 But that which one firm does with impunity may become
illegal when all the firms in an industrial group adopt the same
policy."' Hence, in the conscious parallelism cases, proof of illegal
restraint and the conscious adherence thereto by the members of
the industrial group, are both necessary and sufficient for conviction.
A number of commentators have leveled deprecatory criticism
upon the doctrine of conscious parallelism.8s In reviewing the cases
in which the doctrine emerged, they point out that the courts have
mistakenly construed evidence of consciously parallel market prac-
tices to imply the presence of conspiracy. Hence conscious paral-
lelism has in its early childhood been nicknamed "implied con-
spiracy." The criticism finds basis in the fact that the doctrine did
emerge as an adjunct to proof of conspiracy in both Section 1 and
Section 2 cases and that some courts have made the incorrect in-
ference of conspiracy from mere conscious parallel action.8, These
writers have been preoccupied, however, with the erroneous as-
sumption that conspiracy is a prerequisite to liability under Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Thus they have failed to recognize the true
nature of consciously parallel restraints of trade.
For example, one commentator writes critically of the use of
conscious parallelism of action as part of the evidence for a Section
1 violation because it lacks the subjective elements of conspiracy,
characterized by "meeting of the minds," "unity of purpose," "col-
86. Refusal to deal by one firm without proof of an intent to monopolize
is legal. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919) ; Brosious v.
Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F. 2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952); Comment, Refusals to Sell
and Public Control of Conpetition, 58 Yale L. J. 1121 (1949).
87. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 183
(1944) ; see Sheehy, The Legal and Factual Content of Recent Geographic
Pricing Cases, 37 Geo. L. J. 183, 199 (1949).
88. Rahl, supra note 83; Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 693 (1951) ; Sunder-
land, Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3 Syracuse L. Rev.
60, 68 (1951) ; Wood, The Supreme Court and a Changing Antitrust Con-
cept, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 309, 329-331 (1949).
89. The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit affirmed within one
month two motion picture cases involving evidence of consciously parallel
action in restraint of trade. In the first, a jury had inferred no joint action
from evidence of parallel action. Fifth and Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 176
F. 2d 587 (1949). In the second, a jury had inferred joint action from evidence
of parallel action. Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 176 F. 2d 594 (1949).
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lusion," "common design." 90 Of course the inference of conspiracy
is incorrect and for purposes of the democratic requirement of
exactness in criminal law it should not be drawn.9 ' But, as stated
above, the independent interdependence of the firms in planning is
collusion in one of its more subtle forms. Although they do not
meet or communicate directly, theirs is a "meeting of the minds"
that each will be non-aggressive in price or marketing policies in
the then existing manner as long as his rivals are of the same mind.
There is a "unity of purpose" to keep prices stable, not to spoil the
market, and to avoid "cutthroat" competition. And this same pur-
pose may be called a "common design," though reached indepen-
dently by each firm in adjusting to the presence and possible re-
actions of his rivals in the market. 2 Upon proof of a non-competi-
tive market condition resulting from such parallel action, the neces-
sary conditions for conviction under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
have been established. The confusion of the courts in searching for
conspiracy when the adherence by the firms in the market to an
unreasonable restraint of trade was the real question before them
has muddled and impeded the growth of the antitrust laws in at-
tacking this type of multi-firm monopoly manifestation.
This logically necessary construction of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act leads directly to the question of how that section is cor-
related with Section 2 of the Act. Chief Justice White's interpreta-
tion of the interrelation between the two sections demonstrated the
breadth of the legislative intent 3 After stating that Section 2 was
intended to supplement and prevent evasion of Section 1, the pro-
hibition of which was any undue restraint of trade, he goes on to
state that :""
"... monopoly and the acts which produce the same results as
monopoly, that is, an undue restraint of the course of trade,
all came to be spoken of as, and to be indeed synonymous with,
restraint of trade."
This is a recognition of the economic conclusion that restraining
trade in any manner is the exercise of some monopoly power; con-
versely, monopolizing or the exercise of monopoly power restrains
trade.
90. Rahl, supra note 83, at 752.
91. Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S.
440, 445, 451-452 (1949); cf. Frankfurter dissenting in Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U. S. 613, 626 (1949).
92. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 93, 107 (6th Cir.
1944).
93. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United State, 221 U. S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
94. Id. at 61.
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Senator Hoar reported the bill in its final form out of the Judici-
ary Committee. He concluded that, after monopolies by patent
from the king were all abolished, monopolizing came to have the
same meaning as engrossing 5 He indicated that the effect of the
bill was to extend common law prohibitions to interstate and inter-
national commerce. It is significant that the engrossing could be
effected by one firm and does not necessarily require combination.,
This early interpretation by Senator Hoar finds support in Justice
Douglas's statement that ". . . the two sections overlap in the sense
that a monopoly under § 2 is a species of restraint of trade under
§ 1.3) 9.
Justice White's opinion suggests that after monopoly had come
to mean engrossing, one form of restraint of trade, its connotation
was broadened to become synonymous with restraint of trade gen-
erally.98 However, even if monopoly is interpreted to mean only
engrossing, appreciable non-competitive market activity was to be
found illegal, whatever its source. The pervasiveness of this sec-
tion of the opinion was, of course, offset by the dictum that, fol-
lowing the common law, the act declared illegal only those restraints
which a court should find to be unreasonable in light of the facts
of the case.99
95. 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890); cf. Adler, Monopolizing at Common
Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 246,
258-263 (1931), where it is argued that monopolizing was a collective term
to denote the three common law offenses of engrossing, forestalling and re-
grating.
96. Senator Edmunds quoted Webster's Dictionary as authority for a
general definition of monopolizing as the acquisition of market control by a
single firm. 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890).
97. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226 n. 59(1940).
98. "As by the statutes providing against engrossing the quantity en-
grossed was not required to be the whole or a proximate part of the whole
of an article. ... [A]nd by operation of the mental process which led to con-
sidering as a monopoly acts which although they did not constitute a
monopoly were thought to produce some of its baneful effects, so also because
of the impediment or burden to the due course of trade which they produce,
such acts came to be referred to as in restraint of trade." Standard Oil Co.
of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 53-54 (1911).
99. The original draft submitted by Senator Sherman held void".., all
arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between per-
sons or corporations made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free
competition. . . ." 21 Cong. Rec. 1765 (1890). Senator Sherman stated that
this draft merely codified and extended the geographical scope of the com-
mon law and was more limited than "[ijf this bill were broader than it is and
declared unlawful all trusts and combinations in restraint of trade. .. ."
Id. at 2461. The revised bill reported out of the Judiciary Committee, id.
at 2901, 3145, which was the form in which the law was passed, used this
language which Senator Sherman had said was broader than the common law.
Compare the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v.
United States, 221 U. S. 1, 82 (1911).
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Justice White's interpretation of restraint of trade supports the
view stated above that Section 1 not only holds agreements in
restraint of trade illegal, but must also mean that the restraints of
trade themselves are illegal. Since both sections were designed to
curtail restraints of trade and monopoly (or the exercise of monop-
oly power), no matter how the result is accomplished, it must be
illegal.
The recent recognition of the significance of this interpretation
of the Sherman Act in the Griffith and Lorain Journal cases100 is
in effect a challenge to the rather sharp dichotomy which the
Supreme Court has created between Section 1 and Section 2
cases.110 The general failure of Section 2 prosecutions during the
first fifty years of the Act'0 2 as contrasted with the general success
of Section 1 prosecutions could hardly have happened if the Court
had recognized that the two sections are so closely interrelated.
From the recent language of the Court, it appears that the mere
exercise of substantial monopoly power, regardless of the percentage
of the market controlled, has become the basis of Section 2 con-
viction. Thus that section would have a newer, broadened inter-
pretation. 0 3 However, the Griffith and Lorain Journal cases both
involved substantial control by one firm of the entire local market.
And the recent Times-Picayune case has re-emphasized substantial
monopoly control of the market concerned as a necessary condition
to Section 2 conviction. 0 4 As the law now stands, it appears that
the exercise of monopoly power; i.e., monopolistic abuses, are n
illegal if the firm (or group of firms acting together) involved does
-not have a monopolistic position (substantial control) of the market
concerned.'
If the present interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
were as broad as Mr. Justice White's statement, it would present
an alternative avenue for the prosecution of illegally consciously
parallel marketing policies. The oligopolistic group can be success-
100. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 106 (1946) ; Lorain Journal
v. United States, 342 U. S. 143, 153-154 (1951).
101. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226
(1940) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 788 (1946).
102. Levi, supra note 18; Handler, supra note 12; United States v.
United States Steel Co., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; United States v. International
Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927).
103. Rostow, Monopoly Under the Shernan Act: Power or Purpose,
43 Ill. L. Rev. 745 (1949).
104. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 608
(1952).
105. Much of the indeterminateness of the scope of § 2 grows out of
the courts' uncertainty as to the meaning and content of the monopoly. Levi,
.4 Two Level Anti-Aonopoly Law, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567 (1952).
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ful in establishing and continuing stable market policies that avoid
competitive rivalry only if the large majority of firms in the group
adhere to the non-aggressive policies. Aggressive price cutting or
product change by one firm could upset any stable equilibrium the
group had reached. Hence the market manifestation of oligopolistic
collusion will be that most of the firms in the industrial group will
be following the same non-competitive policies. One firm in a
multifirm group may be held to restrain trade reasonably or ex-
ercise some monopoly power with impunity. However, common
non-competitive action by a majority of firms in an industry or
locality is in essence the same as a monopoly of the type conven-
tionally attacked under Section 2.106 The group's action tends more
to resemble a single firm monopoly as the coordination or confi-
dence among the firms in each other's policies increases.
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 2, unless
a firm has substantial control of an entire industry, 0 7 its monopoly
power becomes illegal only when it is abused.0' Since, in many
cases no one firm in an oligopolistic group has by itself substantial
control in its industry, a theory of monopoly abuse by the group
would appear to be the route through which Section 2 prosecution
would be effective here. This, of course, coincides with the under-
lying economic analysis. An industrial group may be oligopolistic,
but dynamic market factors may preclude collusive adjustment of
any kind. It is when the market stabilizes and rivalry becomes non-
aggressive that oligopolistic abuses should become readily subject
to prosecution under the anti-monopoly laws.
One major objection may arise to prosecution under Section 2.
of the Sherman Act. That is that it may be impossible to prove a
specific intent to monopolize. This objection can be obviated, how-
ever, by the fact that oligopoly is illegal only when non-competitive
market manifestations result. In this class of cases, a specific intent
to restrain trade need not be shown. It is sufficient that a restraint
of trade or monopoly, within the purview of the act, results as a
106. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948) ;
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946). The first
of these cases involved some elements of actual conspiracy.
107. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
108. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948); Johnson and
Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 269, 278 (1949) ; Levi,
The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1947).
Even with its emphasis upon power and intent to monopolize as conditions for
§ 2 conviction, intent was inferred from evidence of monopolistic abuses.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 786 (1946); Kahn,
Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 29 (1953).
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consequence of the firms' conduct. 10 This follows Senator Sher-
man's view that market effect, not intention, should be the basis of
illegality under the act.1 And this rule is correlative with the
central conclusion of this paper as to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act; namely, that market effect, group adherence to a restraint of
trade, is the crucial question for liaiblity. Hence, conspiracy in the
form of a previous agreement, the element of intent in Section 1,
is not a necessary condition for liability if the undue restraint of
trade is proven.
In the conventional conspiracy case, evidence of independent
decision and action by those accused is sufficient defense to the
charge. However, this is no defense in the conscious parallel action
case. Independent action is the criteria of the consciously parallel ac-
tion case that distinguishes it as a type of collusion distinct from con-
spiracy. Nor is it a defense in the conscious parallelism case that the
best business judgment of all of the firms in an industry prompted
them to their similarity of conduct."' The justification or motive
for price or trade practices in any type market from competitive to
monopolistic is profit maximization." 2 This is the "best business
policy" justification for any firm's market action. The defense of
individual decision that a specific policy will maximize profits is
not only consistent with a monopolistic result, given oligopoly as the
market structure, it is the expected result. The only defense is to
show that the consequent market conditions demonstrate an ab-
sence of interferences with ompetition and market rivalry re-
sponding to the basic supply conditions of the market.
A point of emphasis in the analysis of conscious parallel action
must be upon the facts that collusive oligopoly is a manifestation
of monopoly. The problem is basically one of market structure, of
fewness of firms in a market and the consequent tendency to a
monopoly equilibrium. In such a market an injunction restraining
conscious parallel action would be, in most cases, an unworkable
remedy. It would be comparable to ordering a single firm monopoly
109. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543 (1913) ; United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 275 (1942) ; United States v. Griffith, 334
U. S. 100, 105 (1948) ; see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S.
495, 525 (1948) ; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594,
614 (1953).
110. See note 85 supra.
111. G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theater Co., 107 F. Supp. 453(N.D. Ohio 1952) ; Chorak v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 196 F. 2d 225 (9th
Cir. 1952) ; Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
201 F. 2d 306, 313 (4th Cir. 1953).
112. The prohibitions of the Sherman Act can not be evaded by good
motives. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49
(1912).
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not to set a monopoly price or not to adopt other policies which
would maximize the profits of his monopoly. The only effective and
lasting remedy to a monopoly or collusive oligopoly is to alter the
basic market structure by dissolution of the one or few firms into
many firms.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of conscious parallelism of action brings to anti-
monopoly law a new basis for prosecution in its weakest area,
monopolistic market practices in the few-firm industry. In focussing
the weight of Section 1 prosecutions on the restraint of trade or
monopolistic practices, courts may come to recognize that conspira-
cy is not a prerequisite for liability under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.1 1 3 The alternative of prosection as a monopoly under Section
2 of the Act, upon the showing of the oligopolistic interferences
with competition, would make the sections supplementary to each
other in this type of case. The effect could be to broaden the scope
and strengthen prosecutions under both sections of the Sherman
Act. This would revitalize the earlier interpretation which stressed
the close interrelation between the two sections as means to more
effective monopoly prosecution.
Given the conclusion that conspiracy is not a necessary condi-
tion for liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the province
of the jury in the antitrust case in the few-firm industry should be
substantially lessened. The jury would need only to find whether
there existed similar or parallel action, if the firms were aware of
*each other's adherence to such marketing policies, and the resulting
conditions in the market. This would eliminate the mystic specula-
tion by both courts and juries as to how much independent parallel
action in this type case can be said to add up to joint action. There
would thus be a recognition that collusion can be of a type (or
degree) other than conspiracy, and the confusion between con-
scious parallelism and conspiracy could be ended.
In order to utilize the doctrine of consciously parallel restraints
as an effective tool of social control, courts must face squarely in
each case the question whether marketing or price policies and their
resulting market conditions are non-competitive. This necessarily
requires the extensive use of economic analysis. Once it is recog-
nized that the nebulous legal device of inferring conspiracy where
113. It has been suggested that uniformity of action might be con-
sidered prima facie evidence of illegal combination, and then the defendant
-would have to present evidence to rebut the presumption of illegality. Handler,
Anti-trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 Record of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York 59, 67 (1951).
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none exists is but an evasion of the real problem of market results.
economic analysis becomes the necessary tool to measure the legal-
ity of marketing policies.
Non-competitive market results are, of course, manifestations
of monopoly power. However, under present law, non-competitive
marketing policies and market conditions are not all illegal re-
straints of trade. The "rule of reason" has put very great discretion
into the hands of courts to hold restraints of trade legal.114 This is
an assumption of administrative or regulatory power to weigh so-
called mitigating circumstances in deciding what are good and what
are bad restraints of trade. 115 Ift the conscious parallelism cases,
where an economic analysis of the market results should be the
crucial factor in the decision, courts are thus given a possible means
to exempt from punishment or liability such non-competitive ac-
tivity as they find grounds to hold fair or reasonable.:" It is this
abyss in effective legal control which can defeat the development
of the conscious parallelism doctrine even if the phantom of in-
ferred conspiracy is destroyed.
Application of the analytic techniques for conscious parallelism
cases developed above impels some critical comment as to the
recent Supreme Court case limiting the doctrine. In the Theatre
Enterprises case, the facts as recited in the Court of Appeals opinion
showed the existence of both of the factors suggested above as
necessary and sufficient for liability. 17 A uniform marketing policy
toward plaintiff was admitted. Awareness that the other distributors
were following like policies can be inferred from the very fewness of
114. Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition or Work-
able Monopolyf, 63 Yale L. J. 348 (1954).
115. One of the greatest of American jurists has labeled this assumption
of regulatory power by the Supreme Court as judicial legislation. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting in part in Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1 at 82, 90 (1911). He went on to quote Senator Nelson's almost
omniscient prediction: ". . . the injection of the rule of reasonableness or un-
reasonableness would lead to the greatest variableness and uncertainty in the
enforcement of the law. The defense of reasonable restraint would be made
in every case and there would be as many different rules of reasonableness as
cases, courts, and juries." Id. at 97.
116. Feudal regulation of markets on the basis of fairness or reasonable-
ness, as opposed to the self-executing economic controls of competition in as
pure a form as can be enforced, is but one major example of the twentieth
century retreat from a free society. See Yankwich, Competition, Real or Soft?,
14 F. R. D. 199 (1952) ; Pound, The New Feudalism, 16 A. B. A. J. 553(1930). As to the inherent weaknesses that make for a breakdown of admin-
istrative regulation of markets, see Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility
Concept, 16 J. Land & P. U. Econ. 8 (1940), reprinted in Readings in the
Social Control of Industry 280 (1942).
117. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
201 F. 2d 306 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 346 U. S. 537 (1954). See p. 810 supra
for a discussion of the facts of this case.
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sellers in the market. This inference is supported by defendants'
concerted refusal to license films to plaintiff at higher fees than bid
by other exhibitors. Such a sacrifice of short run profits for the pos-
sibility of long run profits in not upsetting the oligopolistic pattern
of distribution can continue only as long as all sellers join in the
pattern. Each knows that deviating from the established marketing
pattern may induce aggressive rivalry in marketing resulting in
lower monopoly profits for all. A resulting restraint of trade was also
shown, in that plaintiff was excluded from the market for first-run
films. The regimented system of film distribution in this case was
strikingly similar to the one found illegal in the Milgram case."",
In affirming the judgment for respondents, the Supreme Court
rejected plaintiff's contention that the trial judge should have
directed a verdict in its favor and submitted to the jury only the
question of the amount of damages. Based on the pleadings before
the court, this ruling was correct. Plaintiff had pleaded conspirac3
in restraint of trade. It had presented substantial evidence tha
trade was restrained, but none of conspiracy. The trial court thus
considered it a jury question as to whether conspiracy could be
inferred from the parallel business behavior shown. On the basis
of the pleadings before it, the trial court might well have directed
a verdict for defendants.
From the point of view of this paper, plaintiff's failure in the
Theatre Enterprises case was essentially one of pleading. His evi-
dence established the existence of consciously parallel action in
restraint of trade, but he had pleaded conspiracy in restraint of
trade. A suggestion as to pleading more in conformity with the
proof is found in the Rigid Steel Condwit case, an unfair competi-
tion suit.119 Following that case, plaintiff should have pleaded an
additional separate count for consciously parallel action in restraint
of trade. Such a cause of action would be an innovation to Sherman
Act pleading, but its adoption follows logically from the theory pre-
sented herein. Proof was made of consciously parallel business poli-
cies which restrained trade, though evidence of a preconceived plan
to restrain trade was lacking. The resulting market conditions
showed a deviation from competition, a restraint of trade, in which
the major sellers in the market had joined. A separate cause of
action pleading this restraint of trade, as distinguished from the
118. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F. 2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951).
119. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir.
1948), affd by a divided court sub norn Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 33F
U. S. 956 (1949). See p. 806 supra for a discussion of this case.
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unprovable count for conspiracy, would allege those provable mar-
ket restrictions in which the major sellers did join and which did
injure plaintiff. Under the legal theory of this paper, these restraints
of trade themselves are deviations from competition which the
Sherman Act was designed to remedy.
The Theatre Enterprises case has demonstrated that oligopo-
listic restraints of trade can not be attacked through the avenue of
conspiracy because, by definition, they lack the essential pre-
requisite of joint planning. If the doctrine of consciously parallel
action in restraint of trade is to survive and to contribute to the
growth of anti-monopoly law, it must stand as a distinct cause of
action. Hence, it must be based upon a revitalization of the perva-
sive prohibitions against all forms of restraints of trade and monop-
olies that the 51st Congress wrote into the Sherman Act.

